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A New Cartesian Inconsistency:
Moral Skepticism, The Excusing Condition, and Progress
Abstract
I argue that there is an inconsistency at the heart of Descartes’ ethics borne
out of his epistemology and metaphysics. Descartes’ moral skepticism about
first-order moral judgments coupled with his commitment to a strong ex-
cusing condition for virtuous subjects in case of moral failures, precludes
virtuous subjects from experiencing the right types of passions (remorse
and repentance) that are required for (moral) progress. I contend that, un-
like other tensions in Descartes’ system that can be explained away, this one
is enigmatic. Nonetheless, these blunders indicate important lessons about
how ethics can go wrong within a rationalist system.
Keywords: Cartesian ethics, moral skepticism, virtue theory, progress
1 Introduction
Descartes’ ethics, interspersed throughout a variety of texts and correspondence,
is rightfully receiving increasing attention in the literature.1 Against the common-
place view that Descartes was not a serious moral philosopher,2 Commentators
have offered reconstructions of Descartes’ ethical views with the aim of showing
1I employ the following abbreviations: ‘AT’: Oeuvres de Descartes (cited by volume and page),
Adam and Tannery (1996); ‘CSM’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (cited by volume and
page), Cottingham et al. (1985); ‘CSMK’: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (cited by page),
Cottingham et al. (1991).
2This view was, perhaps, initiated by Leibniz who wrote that “Descartes has not much advanced
the practice of morality” (1989: 241). In that letter to Molanus, Leibniz levels a series of objections
against Descartes’ ethics, claiming that his metaphysical and epistemological system precludes
any genuine notion of virtue or happiness for the moral subject. Santilli writes that Descartes’
“problem of finding a rational criterion for moral judgment, which vexes so much of modern ethics
after Descartes, does not seem to have worried Descartes himself. It is, quite possibly, his lack
of a systematic attempt to address what has been generally taken to be the central question of
philosophical ethics that has caused his reputation as a moral philosopher to suffer” (1992: 362).
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that he has a novel, systematic, and perhaps viable ethical theory.3 I am sympa-
thetic to such projects; however, in the present context I aim to reveal a neglected
inconsistency that lies at the intersection of Descartes’ epistemology, metaphysics,
and virtue theory.
I begin by presenting the problem at hand as a mere tension. Assume that
Descartes is committed to the following two claims, put roughly:
MORAL SKEPTICISM: A virtuous or non-virtuous subject, S, cannot raise
her first-order moral judgments to the status of knowledge, because there is
no way for S to verify whether any given first-order moral judgment is true or
false.
EXCUSING CONDITION: A first-order moral judgment and its corresponding
course of action that proceeds from S’s virtuous will can only be praiseworthy,
but never blameworthy. This condition extends to cases where S’s virtuous will
leads her to enact a moral judgment that generates evil consequences.
The worry is that the combination of Moral Skepticism and the Excusing Con-
dition preclude a virtuous subject from making progress.4 Again, let us assume
that Descartes is commited to the following (non-controversial) claim, put roughly:
PROGRESS: A virtuous subject, S, should revise her moral judgments and
actions in light of moral failures.
3The following sampling of commentaries offer, for the most part, sympathetic interpretations
of Cartesian ethics: Davies (2001); Marshall (1998); Morgan (1994); Naaman-Zauderer (2010);
Rutherford (2004), Shapiro (1999, 2008, 2011).
4The type of progress I am targeting is restricted to virtuous subjects. I grant that Descartes can
account for certain types of progress. For example, when a non-virtuous subject becomes virtuous.
My contention is that virtuous subjects are, in a sense to be fleshed out below, morally static.
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Unfortunately, Moral Skepticism and the Excusing Condition seem to preclude
accounting for the following necessary condition on Progress, put roughly:
PROGRESS GROUNDS: A virtuous subject, S, can correct her moral failures
and make progress only if: S is motivated by the appropriate passions to revise
her moral judgments and actions.5
The interpretive concern is that Descartes might not be able to account for Progress
Grounds because Moral Skepticism and the Excusing Condition plausibly en-
tail that either: (1) a subject will not undergo the relevant passions required for
Progress or (2) even if they do undergo the relevant passions, they should resist
their motivational force.
As I have presented it thus far, these (assumed) Cartesian theses are arguably
in tension. In what follows, I argue that Descartes is committed to them, and that
they are inconsistent. In sections 2 and 3, I clarify and defend Moral Skepticism
and the Excusing Condition. In section 4, I develop Progress and Progress
Grounds in more detail, and argue that Progress Grounds cannot be satisfied
because a virtuous subject ought not experience the relevant passions, namely,
remorse and repentance. In section 5, I respond to a plausible objection that, on
the surface, reconciles the inconsistency. In section 6, I offer my closing remarks.
I reject the claim that the inconsistency I have demonstrated is artificial. I pinpoint
why Descartes’ ethics goes array in his rationalist system, and what he would need
(but cannot get given his commitments) to avoid the inconsistency.
5There are, of course, other necessary conditions involved in Progress Grounds. For the task
at hand, however, the necessity of having the right types of motivation in order to make progress is
the one I will focus on.
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2 Moral Skepticism
The starting point for arriving at Moral Skepticism is Descartes’ account of
knowledge (scientia). Here is the standard definition:
SCIENTIA: A subject, S, is in a state of scientia if and only if:
1. S judges that p
2. p is true
3. S has absolute certainty that p.
How a subject can meet conditions (2) and (3) is where commentators have diverg-
ing interpretations.6 However, a common thread in these accounts is that, in one
way or another, scientia must be grounded in clear and distinct perceptions. For it
is clear and distinct perceptions (coupled with the right kind of awareness of God’s
existence and non-deceptive nature) that can render a subject’s judgments true
and absolutely certain. My assumption—and I take this to be uncontroversial—
is that scientia is the only sense of genuine knowledge within Descartes’ system.
While Descartes may use the term ‘knowledge’ loosely in other contexts, his funda-
mental epistemological commitments preclude any judgments that are not wholly
grounded in clear and distinct perceptions to count as knowledge, i.e. scientia.7 As
6See, for example, Alanen 2008; Bennett 1997; Carriero 2008, 2009; Della Rocca 2005; Jolley
2010; Loeb 1992, 1998; and Sorell 2010
7Lex Newman (2019) has explored the possibility that Descartes might be an epistemic con-
textualist. On this view, the epistemic standards for knoweldge would shift based on what type of
context the subject is in. The upshot is that Descartes might be able to countenance other forms of
knowledge that do not meet the standards of scientia (for example, demonstrations in geometry).
Newman only gestures at this view—and significantly, has not applied it to the context of moral
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Descartes tell us “all knowledge [scientia] is certain and evident cognition [cog-
nitio certa & evidens]” (Rules, AT X: 362/CSM I: 10) and “no act of awareness
[cognitio] that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be called knowledge [scien-
tia]” (Second Replies, AT VII: 141/CSM II: 101). All other epistemic states, then,
amount to either a type of conviction (cognitio) or mere opinion (persuasio).8
Only a small class of judgments have the potential to be raised to the status of
scientia. These are theoretical judgments that fall under the sphere of the “contem-
plation of truth,” i.e. judgments about metaphysics, mathematics, logic, philosophy
of religion, and possibly certain aspects of natural philosophy (Second Replies, AT
VII: 149/CSM II: 106). In such matters where the intellect is unhindered by the
senses, clear and distinct perceptions are possible. However, in the sphere of the
“conduct of life” Descartes claims that clear and distinct perceptions, in principle,
are unattainable (Ibid.).
According to Descartes, non-theoretical judgments can only achieve moral cer-
tainty, that is:
Certainty which is sufficient to regulate our behaviour, or which mea-
sures up to certainty we have on matters relating to the conduct of
life which we never doubt, though we know that it is possible, abso-
lutely speaking, that they may be false. (Principles IV.205, AT VIIIA:
327/CSM I: 289, fn. 2)
deliberation—and it has not been fully defended elsewhere. My sense of Descartes’ epistemology
falls in line with the standard view, which rules out epistemic contextualism. Thus, I will bracked
that view here.
8For a more detailed account of different Cartesian epistemic states see Clark (2019: 665).
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Although Descartes couches moral certainty in terms of the conduct of life, there
are a variety of judgments outside of practical matters (e.g. in natural philosophy)
that can only achieve moral certainty as well. For present purposes, however, our
primary concern is with first-order moral judgments, which clearly fall under the
class of non-theoretical judgments. By a first-order moral judgment (from hereon
‘moral judgment’), I mean a judgment of the following form:
MORAL JUDGMENT: “I ought to ϕ in z moral situation at tn.”
Restricting our attention to moral judgments, there are two points to make about
this central text regarding moral certainty.9 First, Descartes give us an epistemic
claim: a moral judgment, even if morally certain, can always be doubted. Second,
Descartes gives us a normative claim: even though the epistemic claim is true,
subjects (1) ought not doubt morally certain moral judgments and (2) ought to act
in accordance with these judgments.
Before proceeding to establish Descartes’ moral skepticism, I must head off a
potential objection. The normative claim implies that a subject is right and justified,
in a certain sense, in forming and acting in accordance with a (morally certain)
moral judgment. As such, one might think that this shows that Descartes is not a
moral skeptic, for he is establishing norms for moral judgments and actions. To
be sure, Descartes is not a moral skeptic in the sense that he denies that a moral
subject ought to make moral judgments or act virtuously. His moral skepticism
is borne out of the epistemic claim, set against the standards for scientia. As we
9For detailed discussions of the different kinds of certainty in Descartes’ epistemology see Hat-
field 1988; Morris 1970; Schachter 2005; and Voss 1993.
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will see below, the epistemic claim entails that (morally certain) moral judgments
cannot count as genuine knowledge (i.e. scientia). Thus, even though a subject
might be “right” in forming and acting in accordance with a (morally certain) moral
judgment, that judgment could still be false. It is this point alone that constitutes
Descartes’ moral skepticism. Perhaps some may not be comfortable with calling
this ‘moral skepticism’, but this is perhaps a trivial verbal dispute. My use of ‘moral
skepticism’, then, should be taken as a stipulation.
The epistemic claim, when unpacked, reveals two features that are sufficient for
establishing Moral Skepticism. The first feature is that all moral judgments are
truth-evaluable. As a stripe of Cartesian judgment, moral judgments involve the
will’s affirmation of some perceptual content. This structure requires that moral
judgments are (formally) either true or false (Fourth Replies, AT VII: 233/CSM
II: 163). This is key, because it reveals that Descartes is a cognitivist. He cannot
escape the charge of Moral Skepticism by appealing to expressivism (as Hume
might), and claim that moral judgments are reducible to expressions of sentiment,
and thus are not candidates for knowledge in the first-place. Second, in contrast-
ing moral certainty with absolute certainty, Descartes is claiming that (morally
certain) moral judgments are always subject to doubt. They are, in principle, de-
feasible judgments. In contrast, a theoretical judgment that is absolutely certain
can never—in normal circumstances—be doubted and is thus indefeasible. The
upshot, however, is that a subject can never verify whether their moral judgments
are true or false (although God will know their truth value). Consequently, these
two features suffice for a stripe of Moral Skepticism, for they entail that moral
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judgments can never amount to scientia.
Having established Moral Skepticism, let us spell out exactly why moral
judgments, even if they are morally certain, cannot achieve absolute certainty. To
begin, I would like to ward off a potential objection. Descartes claims that moral
judgments must be based, in part, on knowledge of the truth (Letter to Princess
Elizabeth 15 September 1645, AT IV: 291/CSMK: 265; Letter to Princess Eliza-
beth 4 August 1645, AT IV: 267/CSMK: 258). We will discuss two items in this
knowledge of the truth in more detail later. For now, however, we may note that
this set of truths consists of claims about the nature of God and divine providence,
the real distinction between mind and body, physics, and selfless action. However,
the knowledge of these truths alone cannot be sufficient for complete moral delib-
eration. For we must also attend to the particularities of the moral situation.
The particularities of a moral situation that are relevant to moral deliberation
fall into three categories: (1) information about other moral subjects (mind-body
composites), (2) information about surrounding bodies and the environment, and
(3) the consequences of the course of action. Information about (1) and (2) are
accessed through sensory experience; the information in (3) is supplied by imagi-
nation.
According to Descartes, sensory experience supplies obscured and confused
content to the intellect. Strictly speaking, the intellect can clarify such content.
For example, through the intellect we can make geometrical calculations to learn
the true size of the sun (even though it is represented in our visual field as being
very small), and learn that an apple is not phenomenally red (even though it is
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represented as phenomenally red). However, when we are in a moral situation, there
is often not much time to act. As Descartes says we often have to act “on the spur of
the moment” (Letter to Princess Elizabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV: 307/CSMK:
269). We cannot sit and contemplate for extended periods of time when we are
presented with a moral situation, for the opportunity to act will pass us by. Indeed
this is one of the main lessons of Cartesian ethics: that we need to have resolution in
the face of uncertainty, and not have too great a desire for perfection in moral action
such that we induce an excessive anxiety in the soul (irresolution) that prevents us
from acting at all (Brassfield 2013). Thus, we have to be resolute and content in the
face of obscure and confused information about the other mind-body composites
and the environment when we are engaged in moral deliberation.
Turning to the consequences of moral action, these are states of affairs that
(unlike other mind-body composites and bodies in a moral situation) do not exist
yet. The only way to consider the potential consequences of our action is through
imagination.10 We must feign what the possible consequences may be (for some
subset of possible practical judgments), and given all the relevant information we
10Descartes is best read as assigning to imagination the function of calculating the consequences
of our actions in various parts of the Passions, for example:
We have humility as a virtue when, as a result of reflecting on the infirmity of our
nature and on the wrongs we may have previously have done, or are capable of doing
(wrongs which are no less serious than those which others may do), we do not prefer
ourselves to anyone else and we think that since others have free will just as much
as we do, they may use it just as well as we use ours. (Passions III.155, AT XI:
447/CSM I: 385).
In considering the wrongs that we are capable of, these are wrongs that we have to feign through
imagination. For other uses of what we might call moral imagination in Descartes see: Passions
III.201, AT XI: 479-80/CSM I: 400; and PassionsIII.190, AT XI: 471-2/CSM I: 396.
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have (information based on categories (1), (2), and knowledge of the truth) decide
upon a course of action. Because these feigned consequences do not exist and are
in part based on obscured and confused content from (1) and (2) they are intrinsi-
cally obscure and confused as well. We cannot have clear and distinct perceptions
of future states of affairs. Given these cognitive limitations, it follows that moral
judgments can never be wholly grounded in clear and distinct perceptions. Thus,
they cannot meet the standards of scientia. Again, with respect to the possibility
of first-order moral knowledge, Descartes is a skeptic.
3 The Excusing Condition
Let us now turn to the Excusing Condition. The Excusing Condition falls out
of Descartes’ virtue theory. Descartes defines ‘virtue’ or the supreme good as the
firm and constant resolution of the will to arrive at our best moral judgments and to
do our best to carry them out.11 This is a non-standard conception of virtue, that is
at odds with an Aristotelian virtue ethics that divides virtues into different species.
According to Descartes’ conception of the unity of the virtues, all of the virtues
are identical to each other. At bottom, there is only one virtue: the resolution to
use the will well.12 Virtue is a property of the will alone, and whether a subject
11See, for example, Letter to Princess Elizabeth 18 August 1645, AT IV: 277/CSMK: 262; Let-
ter to Princess Elizabeth 4 August 1645, AT IV: 265/CSMK: 258; Letter to Princess Elizabeth 6
October 1645, AT IV: 305/CSMK: 268; Passions II.148, AT XI: 442/CSM I: 382.
12See, for example, Letter to Princess Elizabeth 4 August 1645, AT IV: 265/CSMK: 258; Let-
ter to Queen Christina 20 November 1647, AT V: 83/CSMK: 325; Dedicatory Letter to Princess
Elizabeth for the Principles, AT VIIIA: 2-3/CSM: 191 For commentators who have acknowledge
the Cartesian unity of the virtues see Alanen and Svensson (2007: fn. 8), Naaman-Zauderer (2010:
179-181), and Santilli (1992: 357)
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counts as virtuous depends wholly on whether they meet internalist conditions for
exemplifying this resolution of the will.13
To arrive at the Excusing Condition, we must first consider a metaphysical
committment that is fundamental to Descartes’ conception of virtue. Regarding the
mind, Descartes offers a metaphysics of power and control, based on a distinction
between activity and passivity. The will is the source of activity. The only states of
affairs a subject has genuine control over are her volitions, that is, how she disposes
her will. With respect to all other states of affairs, she is ultimately passive with
respect to their occurrence. Ultimately, the subject does not have control over what
types of perceptions, sensations, experiences, she undergoes. Moreover, the subject
is passive with respect to the states of her body, and the various circumstances in
her environment and society that affect her body and overall well-being (Passions
III.158, AT XI: 459/CSM I: 386). This metaphysical committment shapes three
interrelated features of Descartes’ ethics: moral responsibility, self-esteem, and
happiness. With respect to moral responsibility and self-esteem Descartes writes:
I see only one thing in us which could give us good reason for esteem-
ing ourselves, namely, the exercise of our free will and the control we
have over our volitions. For we can reasonably be praised or blamed
only for actions that depend upon this free will. It renders us in a cer-
tain way like God by making us masters of ourselves, provided we do
13Svensson (2020) has recently argued that whether a subject is virtuous or not is not entirely up
to her, but depends on divine providence as well. This is, in part, because the degree of knowledge
we obtain that is required for virtue is not wholly dependent on us. While I believe this view can
be reconciled with what’s to come, I will bracket this issue for the purposes of this paper.
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not lose the rights it gives us through timidity. (Passions III.152, AT
XI: 445/CSM I: 384)
A subject can only be held morally responsible for states of affairs that are wholly
within her control. She cannot be held accountable for states of affairs that are
outside of her control, even partially. As such, it would be unjustified to praise or
blame a subject for the occurrence of some state of affairs that she is not wholly
responsible for bringing about. Consequently, the only thing for which a moral
agent can have legitimate self-esteem for is the virtuous use of her will. Self-esteem
has to be directed at the right aspect of the self, what truly belongs to us, and
thus what is the only source of our value. These points are central to Descartes’
conception of the sage or the generous person:
[Generosity] Which causes a person’s self-esteem to be as great as
it may legitimately be, has only two components. The first consists
in his knowing [connaı̂t] that nothing truly belongs to him [qu’il n’y a
rien qui véritablement lui appartienne] but this freedom to dispose his
volitions, and that he ought to be praised or blamed for no other reason
than his using this freedom well or badly. The second consists in his
feeling within himself a firm and constant resolution to use it well –
that is, never to lack the will to undertake and carry out whatever he
judges to be best. To do that is to pursue virtue in a perfect manner.
(Passions III.153, AT XI: 445-6/CSM I: 384)
The generous person understands that the only thing that truly belongs to her is the
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freedom to dispose of her volitions, and consequently, that she can only be praised
or blamed for how she uses her free will. As such, she resolves to use her free
will in the best way, by arriving at her best moral judgments (i.e. morally certain
judgments) and to carry them out as best as she can. In having this knowledge and
disposing her will virtuously, the generous person experiences maximally justified
self-esteem. According to Descartes, “esteem, regarded as a passion, is the soul’s
inclination to represent to itself the value of the object of its esteem” (Passions
III.149, AT XI: 443-444/CSM I: 383). The reason why a virtuous use of the will
grounds this sort of self-esteem is because of the value that free will has (it renders
us like God), and that it belongs to us (it is the only property that is under our
control).
This metaphysical commitment also undergirds Descartes’ theory of happi-
ness. Descartes argues for a close relationship between virtue and happiness. On
the standard reading virtue is sufficient for happiness or contentment of mind (al-
though the details are tricky—we will bracket them for our purposes).14 But in
broad strokes, happiness is a good whose acquisition has to depend on us, and as
we know, the only thing that truly depends on us is the use of our will. This is not to
deny that there are other goods or perfections whose attainment would be beneficial
for us. Rather, these other goods—e.g. wealth, beauty, honor, lineage, knowledge,
etc.— depend on fortune and thus can only contribute to our well-being, which is
distinct from happiness:
14For accounts of whether this sufficient condition actually holds see Viljanen (2021) and Svens-
son (2011)
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We must consider what makes a life happy, that is, what are the things
which can give us this supreme contentment. Such things, I observe,
can be divided into two classes: those which depend on us, like virtue
and wisdom, and those which do not, like honors, riches, and health.
For it is certain that a person of good birth who is not ill, and who lacks
nothing, can enjoy a more perfect contentment than another who is
poor, unhealthy and deformed, provided the two are equally wise and
virtuous. Nevertheless, a small vessel may be just as full as a large
one, although it contains less liquid; and similarly if we regard each
person’s contentment as the full satisfaction of all his desires duly reg-
ulated by reason, I do not doubt that the poorest people, least blest by
nature and fortune, can be entirely content and satisfied just as much
as everyone else, although they do not enjoy as many good things. It
is only this sort of contentment which is here in question; to seek the
other sort would be a waste of time, since it is not in our own power.
(Letter to Princess Elizabeth 4 August 1645, AT IV: 264–5/CSMK:
257)
According to Descartes, a key barrier to our achieving happiness, is the experience
of remorse or repentance when we use our will viciously. If a subject experiences
these passions, at least excessively, the subject cannot acquire happiness or con-
tentment of mind. These two passions will be our main objects of concern in the
next section.
The upshot of these commitments is the Excusing Condition. We can see
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Descartes explicitly endorse the Excusing Condition in the following remark to
Princess Elizabeth:
I think also that there is nothing to repent of when we have done what
we judged best at the time when we had to decide to act, even though
later, thinking it over at our leisure, we judge that we made a mistake.
There would be more ground for repentance if we had acted against
our conscience, even though we realized afterwards that we had done
better than we thought. For we are responsible only for our thoughts,
and it does not belong to human nature to be omniscient, or always
to judge as well on the spur of the moment as when there is plenty of
time to deliberate. (Letter to Princess Elizabeth 6 October 1645, AT
IV: 307/CSMK: 269)
According to Descartes, so long as a subject’s moral judgments and actions pro-
ceed from a virtuous will, then she is virtuous irrespective of the consequences
of these moral judgments and actions. A subject can determine whether her moral
judgment and action proceeded from a virtuous will, retrospectively, so long as her
conscience does not testify that she did otherwise.15 Indeed, Descartes claims that
15Descartes does not tell us much about his notion of a conscience, and the standards for relying
on one’s conscience in evaluating one’s moral judgments and actions. However, here is another
relevant text on this point:
with regard to the important actions of life, when their outcome is doubtful that
prudence cannot tell us what we ought to do, I think it is quite right for us to follow
the advice of ‘the voice within (Letter to Princess Elizabeth October or November
1646, AT IV: 530/CSMK: 297).
However, this is cashed out Descartes seems to claim that a person’s conscience will tell her whether
she truly arrived at her best moral judgments, and whether she was resolute in carrying them out.
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we would be vicious even in cases where we made a non-virtuous moral judgment
and action that ended up having good consequences. Good consequences of an ac-
tion do not make-up for a vicious use of the will. The Excusing Condition is part
and parcel of Descartes’ thorougoing internalism with respect to the conditions of
virtue.
One final remark about this passage. Notice that Descartes says that after we
have exited a moral situation we can retrospectively judge that we made a mistake.
It is important to note that he claims that this is a judgment, and not knowledge. If
it were knowledge, then Descartes would be claiming that we can have first-order
moral knowledge. That is, after the fact, I could determine at t2 with certainty
whether I judged and acted correctly or not at t1. But he does not make that claim.
This will be important when we turn to why the virtuous subject cannot satisfy
Progress Grounds in the next section.
4 Progress, Remorse, and Repentance
As Schouls has argued, Descartes is committed to a notion of moral progress that
is dependent on scientific advancement:
Descartes is convinced that through science man can attain mastery
and that such mastery will augment man’s happiness because, as it in-
creasingly frees him from determination by “nature,” it enhances his
autonomy and brings his human nature to greater perfection.2 Happi-
ness, for Descartes, is not to have to toil for daily bread, not to suffer
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from disease, not to be ruled by unregulated passions. That is putting
it negatively. Positively, the words “freedom,” “autonomy,” and “self-
realization” each sum up equally well Descartes’ idea of “happiness.”
Descartes holds that none of this can be attained except through sci-
ence, that only the growth of science allows for progress, for increase
in mastery. (1987: 423)16
I have a more specific conception of progress in mind. Although Descartes is an
internalist regarding the conditions for a virtuous use of the will, he also cares about
the effects that a virtuous agent can bring about in the world. The consequences of
our actions do not bear on whether we are virtuous for they are ultimately out of
our control; nonetheless, one of the goals of the virtuous agent is to do their best to
improve the lives of others. This is one of the main truths—amongst the knowledge
of the truth—that is supposed to guide the virtuous subject in her formation of
moral judgments:
Though each of us is a person distinct from others, whose interests are
accordingly in some way different from those of the rest of the world,
we ought still to think that none of us could subsist alone and that
each of us is really one of the many parts of the universe, and more
particularly a part of the earth, the state, the society and the family
to which we belong by our domicile, our oath of allegiance and our
birth. And the interests of the whole, of which each of us is a part,
16For Descartes’ own statements on epistemic and scientific progress see, for example, Rules, X:
360-361/CSM I: 9-10; and Discourse, AT VI: 63/CSM I: 143
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must always be preferred to those of our own particular person—with
measure, of course, and discretion. (AT IV: 293/CSMK: 266)17
Here, Descartes clearly commits himself to the claim that virtuous subjects ought
to aim toward securing the well-being, virtue, and happiness of others, even to
their own detriment (even though bringing about these good consequences does
not bear on whether a subject is virtuous). Generating good consequences, in short,
is a contingent—not necessary—goal of Cartesian virtue theory.
On Progress, Descartes is committed to the basic claim that virtuous subjects
can and should revise their moral judgments and actions in light of past moral
failures, for the sake of themselves and others. I take this to be a desideratum on
any virtue theory—and one that Descartes is clearly committed to—and thus I will
not textually defend Progress any further.
However, it is important to clarify what a Cartesian moral failure might be.
This can plausibly occur in one of three ways. First, a subject can morally fail
when they do not use their will well—i.e. when they do not use their will to arrive
at their best moral judgments. Second, a subject can morally fail when they do
arrive at their best moral judgments, but fail to carry out the corresponding course
of action resolutely. Third, a subject can morally fail when they arrive at their best
judgments, do their best to carry it out, yet still cause harm.
It is this third type of moral failure that I am particularly interested in. For
clarity, let us call it unsuccessful virtue. By contrast, successful virtue would be
a case where the virtuous subject makes her best judgment, carries it out, and
17For a more detailed account of this item in the knowledge of the truth see Frierson (2002).
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generates good.18 My contention is that while Descartes can account for making
improvements with respect to the first two kinds of moral failures, he cannot do
so with unsuccessful virtue. With this in mind, here is the precesified version of
Progress that will be operative from hereon out:
PROGRESS: A virtuous subject, S, should aim to revise and improve her moral
judgments and actions in light of a particular moral failure, i.e. unsuccessful
virtue.
To see why Descartes cannot consistently account for Progress, we must turn to
Progress Grounds. Recall, Progress Grounds claims that a necessary condi-
tion on securing Progress is that a virtuous subject must be motivated by the right
kinds of passions to improve her moral judgments and actions. Precesified:
PROGRESS GROUNDS: A virtuous subject, S, can make progress (i.e. move
from a state of unsuccesful virtue to successful virtue) only if: S is motivated
by the appropriate passions to revise her moral judgments and actions.
My contention is that Moral Skepticism and the Excusing Condition preclude
virtuous subjects from satisfying Progress Grounds because they will either (1)
not undergo the passions required for Progress or (2) even if they do undergo
these passions, they should resist their motivational force.
18It is important to note, as we will see later, that both unsuccesful and succesful virtue are
sufficient for happiness. There is no difference in the contentment mind of the unsuccessful and
succesful virtuous subject.
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To start, we need to examine Descartes’ account of the passions and their mo-
tivational status. There is a debate amongst commentators about whether the pas-
sions are representational states.19 This disagreement is not relevant to the task at
hand, for both parties agree that regardless of the intentional status of the passions,
the passions are intrinsically motivational. In Passions II.52 Descartes tells us:
I observe, moreover, that the objects which stimulate the senses do not
excite different passions in us because of differences in the objects, but
only because of the various ways in which they may harm or benefit us
or in general have importance for us. The function of all the passions
consists solely in this, that they dispose our soul to want the things
which nature deems useful for us, and to persist in this volition; and
the same agitation of the spirits which normally causes the passions
also disposes the body to make movements which help us to attain
these things. (AT XI: 372/CSM I: 349; see also Passions I.40, AT XI:
359/CSM I: 343; Passions II.79–81, AT XI: 387–388/CSM I: 356;
Letter to Chanut 1 February 1647, AT IV: 603/CSMK III: 307)
Descartes claims that the function of the passions is to dispose (i.e. motivate) the
soul to desire the things which nature deems useful for the mind-body composite,
and to also dispose the body to move in the appropriate ways so as to attain those
things. A passion is motivational when it causes an inclination in the will toward
forming some particular volition. For example, fear motivates the soul (i.e. inclines
19For non-intentional motivationalist readings see Brassfield (2012) and Greenberg (2007). For
representationalist readings see Alanen (2003); Brown (2006); Franco (2015); and Hatfield (2007).
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the will) to flee, courage motivates the soul (i.e. inclines the will) to fight (Passions
I.40, AT XI: 359/CSM I: 343).20
The relevant passions involved in Progress Grounds are remorse and repen-
tence. For Descartes, undergoing both of these passions is necessary for subjects
to make progress in response to recognized moral failures. Here are Descartes’
descriptions of remorse and repentance:
Remorse of conscience is a kind of sadness which results from our
doubting that something we are doing, or have done, is good. It neces-
sarily presupposes doubt. For if we were wholly certain that what we
are doing is bad, we would refrain from doing it, since the will tends
only towards objects that have some semblance of goodness. And if we
were certain that what we have already done was bad, we would feel
repentance for it, not simply remorse. The function of this passion is to
make us inquire whether the object of our doubt is good or not, and to
prevent our doing it another time, as long as we are not certain that it is
good. But because remorse presupposes evil, it would be better never
to have occasion to feel it; and we may prevent it by the same means
as those by which we can free ourselves from irresolution. (Passions
III.177, AT XI: 464/CSM I: 392-393)
20The motivational function of the passions is different than the biological function of sensations:
“the proper purpose of the sensory perceptions given me by nature is simply to inform the mind
of what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of which the mind is a part” (Sixth Meditation,
AT VII: 83/CSM II: 57). The function of a sensation is to inform the soul of what is beneficial or
harmful for it, while the function of a passion is to motivate the soul to achieve what is beneficial
or harmful for it.
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Repentance is directly opposed to self-satisfaction. It is a kind of sad-
ness, which results from our believing that we have done some evil
deed; and it is very bitter because its cause lies in ourselves alone. But
this does not prevent its being very useful when the action of which
we repent is truly evil and we know this for certain, because then our
repentance prompts us to do better on another occasion. But it often
happens that weak spirited people repent of deeds they have done with-
out knowing for certain that they are evil; they are convinced of this
simply because they fear it is so, and if they had done the opposite,
they would repent in the same way. This is an imperfection deserv-
ing of pity, and the remedies against this fault are the same as those
which serve to dispel irresolution. (Passions III.191, AT XI: 464/CSM
I: 396-397; see also Passions II.63, AT XI: 377/CSM I: 351-352)
Both remorse and repentance are a species of sadness: “consideration of a present
evil arouses sadness, when the...evil is one that we regard as belonging to us” (Pas-
sions II.61 XI: 376/CSM I: 351). What distinguishes remorse from repentance,
however, are the epistemic states that undergird them and the distinct functions
of these passions. Remorse is generated when a subject doubts that what she has
done, is good. The function of remorse is to motivate the subject who undergoes
it from performing the same action again. Repentance, on the other hand, is gen-
erated when a subject has certainty that what she has done is evil. The function of
repentance is to motivate the subject to perform better on future occasions.21
21For a more detailed account of the passions of remorse and repentance, see Blessing (2013).
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The problem, however, is that the (unsuccessful) virtuous subject ought not
undergo the epistemic states required to ever experience remorse or repentance.
Before seeing why this is the case, there are two important clarifications in order.
First, since we are examining unsuccessful virtue, both remorse and repentance are
not about a past moral judgment and whether it was best or whether the subjected
was resolute and did her best in carrying out the decided upon course of action.
In unsuccessful virtue, we are considering a case where the virtuous subject really
did use her will well with respect to (1) arriving at her best moral judgment and
(2) carrying out the corresponding course of action. There are no moral failures
with respect to (1) and (2). Rather, the relevant moral failure is with respect to the
outcome or consequences of the action. Remorse and repentance will be primarily
directed at said consequences.
Second, we must clarify the exact epistemic states that undergird remorse and
repentance. With respect to repentance, we must distinguish two types of first-order
moral judgments. On the one hand, there are occurrent moral judgments. These
are the moral judgments that are made when a subject is presently deliberating in a
moral situation. On the other hand, there are retrospective moral judgments. These
are the moral judgments that are made by a subject after she has exited a moral
situation, and they are intended to evaluate her prior occurrent moral judgments,
the corresponding courses of action, and of course, the outcomes of said actions.
This distinction is important, because the epistemic state that undergirds repen-
tance is a retrospective moral judgment. As such, a retrospective moral judgment
is subject to the same epistemic standards as all first-order moral judgments. Sig-
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nificantly, just like occurent moral judgments, retrospective moral judgments can
only achieve moral certainty as well. The epistemic state that undergirds repente-
nace, however, is not a retrospective moral judgment, but a suspension of judgment
for it consists in doubt. In the cognitive architecture of the Cartesian mind, a doubt
obtains when a subject suspends the will and judgment about the truth of some
proposition.
Let us start with remorse. Recall, a subject will undergo remorse only if she
doubts that what she has done is bad. Again by ‘bad’, we mean that her course of
action generated harmful or evil consequences. However, my contention is that the
virtuous subject ought not ever generate such a doubt. As stipulated, unsuccessful
virtue is a case where the virtuous subject genuinely did her best to arrive at her
best moral judgment and to carry it out. As such, her conscience will not testify
against her that she used her will poorly. Indeed, the virtuous subject is supposed
to experience self-esteem in the case of unsuccesful virtue. However, if she were to
experience doubt, then should be experiencing some degree of self-contempt, for
her merit is now under question (Passions III.151, AT XI: 44-445/CSM I: 383). To
be sure, all occurrent moral judgments can be doubted in virtue of being morally
certain. That is the epistemic claim. However, recall that Descartes claims that
(morally certain) moral judgments ought not be doubted. This is the normative
claim. My contention is that the normative claim extends not only to occurrent
moral deliberation, but to retrospective moral deliberation about past moral judg-
ments and actions as well. In short, the moral agent should not feel remorse.
Let us now turn to repentance. Recall, a subject will undergo repentance only
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if she has certainty that what she has done is bad. Again by ‘bad’, we mean that
her course of action generated harmful or evil consequences. My contention is that
the virtuous subject can never have such certainty. To be sure, Descartes does not
specify what type of certainty he has in mind here. But as we know, there are two
options: absolute certainty or moral certainty. If a subject were to have absolute
certainty that the outcome was bad, then there would be legitimate grounds for
remorse and self-contempot. However, that is clearly not possible, as a retrospec-
tive moral judgment about past moral deliberation could only reach a degree of
moral certainty, even though the moral agent now has more information (i.e. she
has seen how her actions have, at least in part, played out in the world). Thus, this
option will not work. But can a subject’s retrospective moral judgment achieve a
higher degree of moral certainty than her original occurrent moral judgment, and
thus serve as grounds for repentance and self-contempt? As conceded, the moral
subject has more information that guides her retrospective moral judgments. It is
plausible, then, that a retrospective moral judgment can have a higher degree of
moral certainty than an occurrent moral judgment, and thus serve as grounds for
repentance. My contention is that even if that is the case, there still would not be
grounds for repentance. Indeed, Descartes makes this explicit in his formulation
of the Excusing Condititon in a text we examined in the previous section:
I think also that there is nothing to repent of when we have done what
we judged best at the time when we had to decide to act, even though
later, thinking it over at our leisure, we judge that we made a mistake.
(Letter to Princess Elizabeth 6 October 1645, AT IV: 307/CSMK: 269)
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Here, Descartes claims that even when we retrospectively judge that we made a
mistake, i.e. that the outcome was bad, there are still no grounds for repentance.
As such, the virtuous subject should still feel self-esteem in the face of unsuccessful
virtue.
Where does this leave us? Recall, I claimed that Moral Skepticism and the
Excusing Condition preclude a virtuous subject from satisfying Progress Grounds
and thus making Progress because either (1) a subject ought not undergo the rel-
evant passions required for Progress or (2) even if they do undergo the relevant
passions, they should resist their motivational force. I believe I have made a plausi-
ble systematic and textual case for (1), that is, why the unsuccessful virtuous ought
not undergo either remorse or regret. However, I have not fully defended (2). One
might resist my reading, and claim that despite Moral Skepticism and the Ex-
cusing Condition it is just a fact that unsuccesful virtuous subjects will undergo
remorse and regret (at least in some cases), and that it will be difficult for them to
resist their motivational force. Perhaps they ought to be motivated by remorse and
regret. In the next section, I will fully defend (2) and seal the deal.
5 Sealing the Inconsistency: Divine Providence
Recall, remorse and regret are a type of sadness a subject will experience when
they regard an evil as belonging to them. One might object that unsuccesful virtu-
ous agents will still feel remorse and repentance—a type of sadness—when they
doubt or judge that their moral judgments have caused harm, because they are
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now regarding that evil as belonging to them. Of course, Descartes claims that
nothing is wholly within our control except the freedom to dispose of our voli-
tions. Indeed, one of the comittments that undergrids the Excusing Condition is
Descartes’ claim that we are only responsible for our thoughts. Nonetheless, our
volitions can be part of a causal pathway that terminates in harm to others. As
such, one might think that the evils that we (in part) bring about in the world do
belong to us in some sense, and thus we should feel remorse and repentance and
consequently strive correct these moral failures for the better.
While this objection is understandable, it ignores a fundamental committment
of Descartes’ metaphysics. According to Descartes, everything that lies outside
of the purview of our finite will, lies under the purview of God’s infinite will. In
other words, everything that is wholly outside of our control is ultimately guided
by divine providence. This is the first truth that Descartes lists in his account of
knowledge of the truth:
The first and chief of these is that there is a God on whom all things
depend, whose perfections are infinite, whose power is immense and
whose decrees are infallible. This teaches us to accept calmly all the
things which happen to us as expressly sent by God. Moreover, since
the true object of love is perfection, when we lift up our minds to con-
sider him as he is, we find ourselves naturally so inclined to love him
that we even rejoice in our afflictions at the thought that they are an ex-
pression of his will. (Letter to Princess Elizabeth 15 September 1645,
AT IV: 291-292/CSMK: 265)
27
As such, the consequences of our actions, whether beneficial or harmful to oth-
ers, does not depend on us in any way. Once volitions terminate in bodily actions
and then cause other states of affairs to occur, the entire causal pathway outside
of our volitions is guided by God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence
(i.e. divine providence). Thus, while we do have a minor part in causal pathways
that terminate in benefiting or harming others, the true causal agent here is God.
As such, states of affairs that occur outside of our will do not truly belong to us,
and thus we should not feel remorse or repentance about the consequences of our
actions at all. Whether these consequences are good or evil, we should trust that
they are a small part of a larger divine plan.22 Indeed, Descartes rehearses this
classic theological point with respect to the problem of epistemic evil, i.e. errors
of judgment, in the Fourth Meditation:
It also occurs to me that whenever we are inquiring whether the works
of God are perfect, we ought to look at the whole universe, not just at
one created thing on its own. For what would perhaps rightly appear
very imperfect if it existed on its own is quite perfect when its function
as a part of the universe is considered. It is true that, since my decision
to doubt everything, it is so far only myself and God whose existence
I have been able to know with certainty; but after considering the im-
mense power of God, I cannot deny that many other things have been
made by him, or at least could have been made, and hence that I may
have a place in the universal scheme of things. (AT VII: 55-56/CSM
22others have to accept the evils that come their way
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II: 39)
This point about divine providence makes some of the claims in the previous sec-
tion more forceful. Recall, the epistemic states that undergird remorse and repen-
tance are doubt that what we have done is good (i.e. that it might be evil) and a
retrospective moral judgment (with some degree of moral certainty) that what we
have done is evil. However, given that the virtuous subject has knowledge of the
truth, she does not have justified grounds for doubting that what she has done is
evil, nor can she have any relevant kind of certainty (whether absolute or a higher
degree of moral certainty than her occurrent moral judgments) that could justifi-
ably cause her to experience repentance. In other words, there really is no way for
a virtuous subject to escape Moral Skepticism, given her required knowledge of
divine providence.
Moreover, knowledge of divine providence is necessary in order for a subject’s
virtue to ground her happiness. As Descartes claims in a variety of texts, virtue is
sufficient for happiness or contentment of mind. But without knowledge of divine
providence, this would clearly not be possible. If all the virtuous subject had was
moral certainty that her actions are virtuous, when faced with evil consequences
of her actions, she would (arguably) always feel remorse and repentance in the face
of these consequences. And, as Descartes claims, remorse and and repentance (at
least when experienced in excess) are severe psychological barriers to experiencing
contentment of mind.
For nothing can impede our contentment except desire and regret or
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repentance; but if we always do whatever our reason tells us, even if
events show us afterwards that we have gone wrong, we will never have
any grounds for repentance, because it was not our own fault (Letter
Princess Elizabeth 4 August 1645, AT IV: 266/CSMK III 258)
Again, Descartes commits himself to the claim that we ought not feel regret or
repentance over states of affairs that are not our fault, i.e. beyond our control.
Nonetheless, we can experience contentment of mind when we trust that not all
morality, and whether there is moral progress in particular, is up to us. Whether
there is moral progress is ultimately dependent on God, and while we must trust
that it occurs, we cannot have knowledge of how it plays out.
6 Conclusion
My analysis of divine providence perhaps raises a new objection. My intention was
to seal the inconsistency. I believe I have done that. However, one might now think
that Descartes is actually deeply consistent here, and that the inconsistency I have
generated is artificial. That is, one might think that Descartes is not committed to
Progress at all, and thus there is no inconsistency for once this committment is
abandoned one finds a deeply coherent epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical
system.
However, my contention is that Descartes is indeed committed to Progress,
even if it is only a contingent feature of his virtue theory. By ‘contingent feature’
I mean that whether a virtuous subject can satisfy Progress (which depends on
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external factors) does not bear on whether she is virtuous or not. Descartes is a
thoroughgoing internalist on this score. Nonetheless, Descartes does think that
unsuccesful virtuous agents can and ought to experience remorse and regret, and
thus make improvements in their judgments and actions (these points are littered
through the Passions). Indeed, in Descartes’ ethics, one finds the repeated claim
that virtuous subjects, particularly those who are generous, ought to be other-
regarding:
Those who are generous in this way are naturally led to do great deeds,
and at the same time not to undertake anything of which they do not
feel themselves capable. And because they esteem nothing more highly
than doing good to others and disregarding their own self-interest,
they are always perfectly courteous, gracious and obliging to every-
one. Moreover they have complete command over their passions. In
particular, they have mastery over their desires, and over jealousy and
envy, because everything they think sufficiently valuable to be worth
pursuing is such that its acquisition depends solely on themselves;
over hatred of other people, because they have esteem for everyone;
over fear, because of the self-assurance which confidence in their own
virtue gives them; and finally over anger, because they have very little
esteem for everything that depends on others, and so they never give
their enemies any advantage by acknowledging that they are injured
by them. (Passions III.156, AT XI: 447-448/CSM I: 385)
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Whether the generous person actually does good to others (in the ways listed in the
above passage) ultimately does not depend on her, but on divine providence. How-
ever, the generous person still ought to strive to be other-regarding, and thus initiate
causal pathways that terminate in benefiting others, even when that requires self-
sacrifice. As such, when she is part of causal pathways that harm others, presum-
ably she should feel remorse or repentance. But the problem is that she shouldn’t
feel remorse or repentance in the Cartesian world: for perhaps harming another
person is exactly what divine providence requires.
In short, the Cartesian virtuous subject, who fully understands and inhabits
Descartes’ epistemological, metaphysical, and moral system, is placed into a in-
tractable bind. She must desire and strive to benefit others, but when she harms
them, she ought not feel remorseful or repent. Instead, she should feel self-esteem,
for she still used her will in the right way. Perhaps a further issue here is that
inhabiting Descartes’ philosophical system generates irreconcilable psychic ten-
sions within the virtuous subject. An unsuccesful virtuous subject’s pre-theoretical
moral intuitions will push her to feel remorse and regret, but her post-theoretical
moral intuitions will tell her to suppress those passions.
So, Descartes’ ethics goes array right at his rationalist foundations. Descartes’
high standards for knowledge (i.e. scientia) coupled with his metaphysics of fi-
nite and divine power or control, undermines his theory of virtue. While there are
aspects of Descartes’ ethics that might be salvageable, one must abandon his ratio-
nalism in order to make those pieces make sense. But what would Descartes need
in order for his virtue theory, and an account of Progress, to work?
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Beyond the problematic metaphysics of finite will and power, my suspicion is
that a key problem lies around the cognitive status of happiness. For Descartes,
happiness seems to be a discrete emotional state whereby the virtuous subject ex-
periences contentment of mind. As such, Descartes sees remorse and repentance
as disrupting said contentment of mind. For if we are constantly experiencing re-
morse and repentance in the face of our moral failures, we will experience suffering
and self-contempt, not happiness. In making our happiness depend on our virtu-
ous use of the will alone, he endorses an Excusing Condition which gets virtuous
subjects off the hook when they morally fail too easily. But if Descartes were to
regard happiness as more akin to a mood, like Leibniz does (1989: 213), then re-
morse and repentance would not compromise happiness. For Leibniz, happiness is
a mood that we experience when we undergo joy, which is when our (intellectual)
pleasures outweigh our suffering and pain. Nonetheless, Leibniz allows that happi-
ness qua mood is consistent with having dips in our experience of joy. We can have
extended moments of our life where we suffer, yet still are happy. And if Descartes
were to see this possibility, then he could allow that although we are not wholly
responsible for the evil outcomes of our actions, we are nonetheless partially re-
sponsible and thus can undergo a healthy degree of remorse and repentance that
could serve as a catalyst for Progress. But these are moves that Descartes does
not make, and I contend, cannot make. In the end, Descarts’ rationalism prevents
him from establish the “perfect moral system” that he seeks (French Preface to the
Principles, AT IXB: 14/CSM I: 186).
33
References
[1] Alanen, L. (2003). “The Intentionality of Cartesian Emotions,” in Passion
and Virtue in Descartes, edited by B. Williston and A. Gombay. Amherst,
NY: Humanity Books. 107–27.
[2] Alanen, L. and Svensson, F. (2007). “Descartes on Virtue.” In Hom-
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